In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy including atoms and a continuum of traders, who behave strategically. We show that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions and the atoms have the same utility functions and endowments, the Stackelberg-Cournot and the Cournot equilibrium equilibria coincide if and only if the followers' best responses functions have a zero slope at the SCE.
Introduction
Oligopolistic competition in general equilibrium has been developed in two main directions. The first is the Cournot-Walras equilibrium approach, which is modeled by Gabszewicz and Vial [1] in an economy with production, and in exchange economies by Codognato and Gabszewicz [2, 3] , Gabszewicz and Michel [4] , and Busetto, Codognato and Ghosal [5, 6] . This class of models includes agents who behave strategically (the atoms), while other agents behave competitively (the atomless continuum of traders). The second is the Cournot equilibrium (CE) based on strategic market games as notably modeled by Shapley and Shubik [7] , Dubey and Shubik [8] , Sahi and Yao [9] , and Amir, Sahi, Shubik and Yao [10] . In this approach, all traders always behave strategically and can send quantity signals indicating how much of any commodity they are willing to buy and/or sell. Some contributions aim at comparing the CE with other strategic equilibria. Codognato [11] studies the equivalence between the Cournot-Walras equilibrium and the CE, while Codognato [12] compares two Cournot-Nash equilibrium models. In this note, we compare the CE and the Stackelberg-Cournot equili-brium (SCE) defined for finite economies in Julien and Tricou [13, 14] . From the benchmark of strategic market games, the SCE concept inserts Stackelberg competition into interrelated markets. We determine the conditions under which the CE and the SCE are equivalent.
The equivalence is studied in an economy embodying atoms and a continuum of traders. We thus consider a mixed exchange economy a la Shitovitz [15] and Codognato [11] , in which the traders who are endowed with a corner endowments are atoms, while the traders endowed with all other commodities are represented by an atomless continuum. Markets are complete and prices are consistent. We assume the individual positions and the timing of moves as given. In addition, existence and uniqueness of oligopoly equilibrium are deleted. We rather focus on the case for which both sets of strategic equilibria can have a nonempty intersection. Indeed, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, and when the atoms have the same endowments and utility functions, the SCE and the CE coincide if and only if the followers' best responses functions have a zero slope at the SCE. We so spread the result obtained by Codognato [11] for Cournotian economies to a class of exchange economies in which the strategic interactions recover from sequential decisions. We also provide a generalization of Julien [16] because henceforth all the traders behave strategically.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the mixed markets exchange economy. Section 3 provides a characterization and a definition of the SCE. Section 4 is devoted to the statement and the proof of the proposition. In Section 5, an example is given. In Section 6, we conclude.
A Mixed Markets Exchange Economy

The Framework
The space of commodites is  . The economy thus includes a finite set of divisible consumption goods, indexed by . Let , and the Lebesgue measure, when restricted to .
Assumptions
Any trader is represented by his initial endowments  , his utility function t U which represents his preferences among the commodity bundles , and his strategy set (see thereafter). A commodity bundle is a point in t ( ) x x X , where t  (a closed convex set). An assignment (of commodity bundles to traders) is an integrable function from to  . All integrals are with respect to . We consider the following set of assumptions regarding utility and endowments.
is continuous, strictly monotone in
. The price vector is given by .
Strategy Sets
Each trader uses fractions of his initial endowment to trade them for the  commodities. The strategic behavior then involves all the amounts of the owned good(s) that are engaged in exchange of all commodities. A strategy for a trader ,  , may be represented by an
kl , where b kl represents the amount of commodity k any trader t offers in exchange for commodity . A strategy set for any trader  may be written:
The strategy set of any trader is the set of all matrices satisfying . A strategy selection for
for all  , and such that kl , are real valued integrable functions on . Therefore, from (1) a strategy selection for T . Given
, , one can define a strategy profile as the aggregate
. In addition, we define B as the aggregate matrix . We also denote by a strategy profile obtained by replacing in by t , . The definition of a CE is given in Codognato [7] for mixed exchange economies. We now characterize and define the SCE.
The Stackelberg-Cournot Equilibrium
The SCE: Characterization
A SCE can be modeled as a sequential game in two steps, which is solved by backward induction. The characterization of the SCE relies on the strategic market game mechanism provided by Sahi and Yao [9] , since it generates consistent relative prices. Thus, given a strategy profile , , with , is the solution to:
These conditions stipulate that the aggregate value of all goods supplied to buy any commodity l must be equal to the aggregate value of this good l supplied to buy any other commodity. From Sahi and Yao [9] , we know that when the matrix B is irreducible, the market price exists and is unique.
The strategic plan of follower t, is determined by two elements: he manipulates the   consistent relative prices, and he takes as given the matrices of bids of all leaders and all other followers. We thus denote by 2 2 \ ( )
) a strategy profile which coincides with (resp. ) for all 0 (resp. ) except for may be written:
The solution to these programs yields the best response functions of follower ). In the symmetric equilibrium, (resp. 2 ( )
The resulting best responses are     
the system of aggregate best response functions may be written:
The system of equations given by (6) determines a consistency among the followers' best response functions.
We assume that the solution  exists and is unique. We denote . The equilibrium allocation for any corresponds to the assignment:
.
The SCE: Definition
A SCE is a noncooperative equilibrium of a game where the players are the traders, the strategies are their supply decisions and the payoffs are their utility levels.
Definition. (SCE) A Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium is given by a matrix
, consistent prices and an allocation Proof. Consider n atoms, each being indexed by i, ( m leaders and followers), and a continuum of traders, each being indexed by t,
. Assume (A1) and (A2):
The strategy profiles are given by:
We first determine the SCE. Given strategy profiles 12 1 a i i  and 21 t the market clearing condi-tion given by (3) leads to:
The first strategic step consists in determining the best-response functions of follower i ,   t , and follower ,
, which are the solutions to:
, one obtains:
, , 
The second strategic step consists in determining the equilibrium strategy of any leader , , whom program may then be written:
, .
At the symmetric SCE, we get 
The first strategic step consists in determing the bestresponses of the followers  
, and ,
, which are the solutions to: 
Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a general equilibrium conceptthe Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium-where all traders behave strategically. One side of the market includes negligible traders, while the other side embodies atoms. In this economy, the strategic interactions recover from sequential decisions.
The framework used belongs to the class of mixed markets exchange models. Traders have not the same "weight": this idea is captured with a mixed measure space of traders. Such a specification notably enables to model asymmetries in the working of market power in interrelated markets. It also gives some insights regarding the consequences of market power in a general equilibrium perspective. Finally, it facilitates comparisons between general equilibrium concepts in economies where all agents behave strategically.
Within this framework, it is shown that the set of Stackelberg-Cournot equilibria and the set of Cournot equilibria can have a nonempty intersection. When the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, and when the atoms have the same endowments and utility functions, the SCE and the CE coincide if and only if the followers' best responses functions have a zero slope at the SCE. Provided conjectures of atoms are consistent, the traders behave as if they played a simultaneous move game. So, the equivalence result stems from consistent conjectures formed by leaders.
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